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Causality between FDI and Financial Market Development:  
Evidence from Emerging Markets 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
This paper studies the causal relationship between foreign direct investment (FDI) and financial 
market development (FMD) using panel data from emerging markets. Most studies of the 
relationship between FDI and FMD have focused on the role of FMD in the link between FDI 
and economic growth, with no deep understanding of direct causality between FDI and FMD, 
especially in emerging markets, where financial markets are in the development stage. We 
document bidirectional causality between FDI and stock market development indicators. For 
banking sector development indicators, the relationship is ambiguous and inconclusive. Care is 
therefore needed when analysing the relationship between FMD and FDI, as results may depend 
on whether the FMD variables used to evaluate causality are stock market or banking sector 
development indicators. 
 
 
JEL Code: F21, O16.  
Keyword: Foreign direct investment, FDI, financial market development, stock market 
development, banking sector development, causality. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In general, the literature on the relationship between foreign direct investment (FDI), 
financial market development (FMD), and economic growth falls into two categories. The first 
finds FDI is only efficient at spurring growth when certain conditions are met, one of which 
consists of a fairly developed financial sector (e.g., Alfaro et al (2004, 2010), Hermes and 
Lensink (2003)).1 The second provides evidence that well-functioning financial sector or market 
liberalization—in other words, FMD—can help spur growth (Bekaert et al (2005), Levine et al 
(2000), Levine and Zervos (1998), and many others).  
In this paper, we study the direct causal relationship between FDI and FMD. We perform 
an empirical assessment of this relationship using panel data from emerging markets. Our focus 
on emerging markets has at least four advantages. First, data are available for almost all the 
countries of our sample. Second, the quality of institutions is less diverse in these countries that it 
would be in a sample that included developed markets, therefore a common explanatory variable 
that can link economic development and other variables in given economy (such as gross 
domestic product (GDP) per capita) will have less effect on the results. Third, our focus on 
emerging economies allows us to study stock market and other financial development variables 
often used in the literature. And fourth, emerging markets are the most relevant sample with 
which to study our topic: developed markets are irrelevant, and less developed or the poorest 
countries may have difficulty attracting FDI even if they have a well functioning financial sector, 
because their smaller market power or lack of resources make them less attractive. 
Should the link between FDI and FMD prove to be relevant, the best way to study that 
link is with a system of endogenous simultaneous equations where the key endogenous variables 
are FDI and FMD. We follow the methodology adopted by Levine et al (2000) to assess causality 
between these two main variables. This methodology consists of using cross-sectional analyses, 
panel procedures, and a system of simultaneous equations for the determinants of FDI and FMD. 
To best of our knowledge, very little theoretical or empirical work specifically addresses 
the direct link between FDI and FMD. For example, Adam and Tweneboah (2009) find a long-
run relationship between FDI and stock market development in Ghana. Al Nasser and Soydemir 
(2010) conduct Granger causality tests between FDI and financial development variables for 
Latin American countries. They show a unidirectional relationship from banking sector 
                                                 
1 See Carkovic and Levine (2005) for a thorough review of the literature. 
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development to FDI and not the reverse; the relationship between FDI and stock market 
development is bidirectional. Their explanation is that FDI can initially promote stock market 
development because of the investment opportunities that FDI-related spillover effects usually 
generate: a more developed stock market may then attract more FDI in turn. These two studies 
focus on a single country or countries in the same geographical location. 
Most other studies more or less related to our work address political economy (e.g., Dutta 
and Roy (2011), Kholdy and Sohrabian (2008), and Rajan and Zingales (2003)) or use capital 
market liberalisation as a proxy for FMD (e.g., Desai et al (2006) and Henry (2000)). With regard 
to political economy, Rajan and Zingales (2003) argue that the only force that can ultimately 
make financial elites adopt more market-friendly policies is the inflow of foreign goods and 
capital. Kholdy and Sohrabian (2008) and Dutta and Roy (2011) both show that political risk 
factors can affect the relationship between FDI and FMD, with Kholdy and Sohrabian positing 
that FDI can enhance financial development by pressuring a corrupt elite to reduce regulation on 
the financial system and allow more competition in the sector. For Dutta and Roy (2011), 
advanced financial markets must co-exist with political stability for an economy to realise the 
benefits of FDI. While undoubtedly interesting, these papers do not focus on emerging markets as 
we do here. Furthermore, they only use some financial development indicators: this could bias 
their findings. Indeed, as we show later, the choice of FMD indicator is crucial to the type of 
relationship that one finds between FDI and FMD.  
As regards capital controls or market liberalisation, Desai et al (2006) argue that capital 
controls are accompanied by high interest rates and that firms respond to capital controls by 
distorting profit reports and dividend repatriation policies, incurring substantial organizational 
and regulatory costs in the process. Liberalising capital controls appears to initiate periods of 
considerably faster growth in the local activities of multinational firms. Henry (2000) shows that 
financial liberalisation is always followed by an increase in the growth rate of private investment 
and FDI. One explanation for why FDI increases is that stock market liberalisation may be 
positively correlated with other changes that reduce the operating risks of foreign multinationals 
and therefore, their cost of capital. 
We document bidirectional causality between FDI and stock market development 
variables. Hence, studies involving both FDI and FMD, especially stock market development, 
must account for potential problems of endogeneity. We therefore use a system of simultaneous 
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equations to further explore the implications for the bidirectional link between FDI and FMD 
while controlling for other factors that drive inflows of FDI and the development of financial 
markets. For FMD variables other than variables related to the development of the stock market, 
such as banking sector development indicators, the relationship is ambiguous and inconclusive. 
For that reason, care is needed when analysing the relationship between FMD and FDI, as results 
may depend on whether the FMD variables used measure development of the stock market or 
development of the banking sector. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section II, we review the literature and 
the theory. In Section III, we describe the data and present descriptive statistics. We also present 
and discuss the results of our unit root and Granger causality tests. In Section IV, we do likewise 
for the empirical regression models and their results. We conclude in Section V. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS 
Theoretical background 
Theoretically, the causal relationship between FDI and FMD has been explained in terms 
of three phenomena. First, Desai et al (2006), Henry (2000), and others argue that an increase in 
FDI net inflows increases the funds available in the economy and causes financial intermediation 
through financial markets or the banking system to boom. Companies involved in FDI are also 
likely to list their shares on the local stock market, as they generally originate from industrialised 
countries where stock market financing is a must for any company that wants to be taken 
seriously.  
Second, Kholdy and Sohrabian (2008), Rajan and Zingales (2003), and others use 
political economy analysis to argue that more FDI reduces elites’ relative power in the economy 
and can force the elite to adopt market-friendly regulations that strengthen the development of 
financial markets.  
Third, a relatively well-functioning financial market can attract foreign investors, who 
perceive such a market as a sign of vitality, openness on the part of country authorities, and a 
market-friendly environment. A relatively well-developed stock market increases the liquidity of 
listed companies and may eventually reduce the cost of capital, thus rendering the country 
attractive to foreign investment (e.g., Desai et al (2006)).  
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Role of FMD in the link between FDI and economic growth 
Although it is possible to test the direct relationship between FDI and economic growth, it 
is legitimate to assume that FDI will flow to countries with better developed financial markets or 
to assume that FDI flows will help develop financial markets, thus leading to increased economic 
growth. With this in mind, and given that empirical data seems to suggest that an advanced 
financial market is a good predictor of FDI inflow, some authors analyse how the development of 
the financial system contributes to the relationship between FDI and economic growth.  
Hermes and Lensink (2003) investigate the role that the development of a financial 
system plays in enhancing the positive relationship between FDI and economic growth. Their 
dataset includes 67 countries, mostly from Latin America and Asia. They find that a certain 
degree of development of the financial system of a recipient country is an important precondition 
for FDI to positively impact economic growth. A more developed financial system contributes to 
the technological diffusion associated with FDI inflow. Of the 67 countries in their dataset, 37 
have a financial system that is developed enough to allow FDI to contribute positively to 
economic growth.  
Alfaro et al (2004) examine the same issue using cross-country data between 1975 and 
1995 and find that FDI alone plays an ambiguous role in contributing to economic growth. 
However, countries with well-developed financial markets gain significantly from FDI. 
Dutta and Roy (2011) empirically investigate the role of political risk in association with 
FDI and financial development. Using a panel of 97 countries over 20 years, they establish a non-
linear association between financial development and FDI inflows. Financial development leads 
to greater FDI inflows up to a certain threshold of financial development, beyond which the 
association becomes negative. However, the authors also find that by altering this threshold, 
political risk factors affect the FDI-financial development relationship. With greater political 
stability, the negative impact of FDI inflows only occurs at a higher threshold of financial 
development. It thus seems that advanced financial markets must co-exist with political stability 
for an economy to capture and enjoy the benefits of FDI.  
Kholdy and Sohrabian (2005) investigate various links between financial markets, FDI 
and economic growth. Using the Granger causality model and a panel of 25 countries over the 
1975-2002 period, they find bidirectional causality between financial markets and FDI in 
countries with higher GDP per capita and more developed markets.  
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Market liberalisation or financial development and foreign investment  
Another strand of literature close to ours consists of studies of investment and market 
liberalisation and studies of the alleviation of capital controls, in the sense that if capital controls 
are the sign of a less developed financial sector, market liberalisation can be interpreted as 
evidence of FMD. 
In this vein, Henry (2000) shows that financial liberalisation is always followed by an 
increase in the growth rate of private investment and FDI. This increase can last for three years or 
longer before returning to the previous rate. But it is difficult to conclude that financial market 
liberalisation is the sole driver of this phenomenon, given that during the same period, numerous 
types of financial and macroeconomics reforms had taken place. More specifically, Henry finds 
that following stock market liberalisation, private investment increases, the ratio of FDI to private 
investment increases, and therefore the sum of private investment and FDI increases. One 
explanation for why FDI increases is that stock market liberalisation may be positively correlated 
with other changes that reduce the operating risks of foreign multinationals operating in the 
country. In this case, the cost of capital to multinationals may also fall. When we hold the cost of 
capital for multinationals constant, FDI may also increase if stock market liberalisation is 
positively correlated with other economic reforms that increase expected future cash flows from 
domestic investment.  
Desai et al (2006) answer the following question theoretically as well as empirically: how 
do capital controls affect the cost of capital for foreign investors? Their theory is that because 
most often a considerable portion of the funding for the local affiliates of multinational investors 
comes from local loans, the higher interest rates that result from capital controls increase the cost 
of capital and can be expected to discourage FDI. Capital controls affect local investments by 
multinational firms because they influence local borrowing rates and increase the cost of 
repatriation. Furthermore, the costs associated with capital controls undoubtedly discourage many 
potential investors from establishing affiliates in the first place. Supporting this theory are data 
from United States-based multinational firms that suggests that capital controls are accompanied 
by high interest rates and that firms respond to capital controls by distorting profit reports and 
dividend repatriation policies, incurring substantial organizational and regulatory costs in the 
process. Liberalising capital controls appears to initiate periods of considerably faster growth in 
the local activities of multinational firms. 
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It is obvious from this discussion that the links between FDI and FMD are tied to 
adjustments for the cost of capital, since FMD reduces the cost of capital and therefore spurs 
investments in local companies or multinationals’ local affiliates.  
Finally, as regards the direct relationship between FDI and FMD, Adam and Tweneboah 
(2009) examine the impact of FDI on stock market development in Ghana. Their results indicate 
that a long-run relationship exists between FDI, the nominal exchange rate, and the development 
of Ghana’s stock market, and that a shock to FDI significantly influences the development of the 
stock market in Ghana. Al Nasser and Soydemir (2010) analyse the relationship between FDI and 
financial development in 14 Latin American countries from 1978 to 2007 and find that a better 
functioning financial market is critical for determining the amount of FDI inflows to these 
countries. Their Granger causality tests between FDI and financial development show a 
unidirectional relationship from banking sector development to FDI and not the reverse; the 
relationship between FDI and stock market development is bidirectional. The authors argue that 
these results indicate that FDI could initially enhance stock market development because of the 
investment opportunities that FDI-related spillover effects usually generate, and that stock market 
development could attract more FDI in turn. 
III. DATA AND CAUSALITY ANALYSIS 
3.1. Data  
Our sample is composed of the following 29 emerging markets: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
China, Colombia, Czech Republic, Egypt, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, 
Jordan, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, 
South Africa, Tunisia, Turkey, Vietnam, Thailand, and South Korea. These markets are located in 
Africa (4 countries), Asia (15 countries), Eastern Europe (4 countries) and Latin America (6 
countries). 
Our data covers 1994 to 2006. We began in 1994 because some countries in our sample 
are former communist nations that did not have a stock market before 1994. After 2007, the data 
is too instable to use.2  
                                                 
2 Because of the 2007 subprime credit crisis, there have been too much uncertainties on financial markets and on 
flows of FDI. For this reason, we ignore data from 2007 and afterwards. 
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We consider the following two commonly-used indicators of FDI: the ratio of FDI to 
GDP (FDIGDP) and the ratio of FDI to gross fixed capital formation (FDIGCF). We extracted 
the data for these variables from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database. 
As for FMD, we divided five indicators into two subgroups: the stock market 
development (SMD) indicators subgroup and the banking sector development (BSD) indicators 
subgroup. The SMD indicators consist of (i) the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP 
(STKMKTCAP) and (ii) the ratio of stock value traded as a percentage of GDP (STKVALTRA).3 
The BSD indicators consist of (i) the ratio of private credit by deposit money banks and other 
financial institutions to GDP (CREDIT), (ii) the liquid liabilities of the financial system (currency 
plus demand and interest-bearing liabilities of banks and non-bank financial intermediaries) 
divided by GDP (LLIAB), and (iii) the ratio of commercial bank assets divided by commercial 
bank plus central bank assets (CCB). We obtained data for these indicators from the World 
Bank’s Global Development Finance database and from the International Monetary Fund’s 
International Financial Statistics database. 
The complete definition and the sources of these variables are provided in Table 1. The table 
also lists the control variables used in the regression analysis. These are discussed in Section IV, 
when we discuss the regression model and its results. 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
3.2. Descriptive statistics and unit root tests 
Figure 1 shows scatter plots of FDI and FMD variables, where we computed the average 
of each variable for each country. From this figure, a linear relationship between stock market 
development variables (STKMKTCAP and STKVALTRA) and FDIGDP seems to exist. We 
observe the same linear relationship between FDIGDP and banking sector development variables 
(CREDIT, LLIAB and CCB). Because the same relationships hold when we use FDIGCF as an 
FDI variable, we do not report those results.  
[Insert Figure 1 Here] 
Table 2 presents the correlations between FDI and FMD variables. We observe a 
correlation of 96% between the two FDI variables. For that reason, we omit FDIGCF and only 
                                                 
3 Note that stock market turnover, another indicator of stock market development, is related to stock market liquidity 
and equals the total value of domestic shares traded divided by market capitalisation. As such, it is obtained by 
combining STKMKTCAP and STKVALTRA. For that reason, we omit stock market turnover from our analysis. 
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use FDIGDP. The correlations between the FMD indicators are also positive but do not exceed 
67%. We also observe positive correlations between FDIGDP and the five FMD variables. 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
In Table 3, we investigate the stationary properties of the FDI and FMD variables. We use 
the Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) and Im, Perasan and Shin (2003) tests for heterogeneous panel 
data. We use the well-known augmented Dikey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) unit root 
tests as well.  
FDIGDP is stationary according to all panel unit root tests. Also, all the reported unit root 
tests show that STKVALTRA and CCB are stationary. STKMKTCAP and LLIAB are I(1) 
according to all unit root tests. The unit root test results for CREDIT are ambiguous: while three 
of the four tests indicate the absence of a unit root, the PP test indicates the presence of a unit 
root. We therefore perform the test on the first difference of CREDIT, and this time, the PP 
rejects the presence of a unit root. We can argue that CREDIT is most likely to be stationary, 
since only one unit root test states the contrary. 
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
3.3. Causality analysis between FDI and FMD 
Studying causal relationships when using panel data is always a challenge because one must 
consider dynamics. Like Arellano (2003), we consider various specifications of a bivariate 
VAR(2) model for the FDI and FMD variables, denoted FDIit and FMDit respectively. Individual 
and time effects are included in both equations. The form of the model is  
FDIit =δ1t +α1FDIi(t-1) + α2FDIi(t-2) + β1FMDi(t-1) + β2FMDi(t-2) + η1i + ν1it,   (1) 
FMDit =δ2t +γ1FMDi(t-1) + γ2FMDi(t-2) + λ1FDIi(t-1) + λ2FDIi(t-2) + η2i + ν2it,   (2) 
where δ1t and δ2t capture the time effect and η1i and η2i capture the individual effect. The 
hypothesis that FDI does not Granger-cause FMD, conditional on individual and time effects 
imposes the restrictions λ1 = λ2 = 0. Conversely, to test whether FMD Granger-causes FDI, we 
examine the restrictions β1 = β2 = 0. 
Practically, we first estimate the VAR system consisting of equations (1) and (2) and then 
use a Wald-type test to verify these two non-causality restrictions. We use Arellano’s two-step 
generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator (2003, pp. 118). More precisely, we use two 
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variants of this estimator: i) the two-step GMM in differences (which we denote by GMM2—
Diff.), which captures the effect of greater persistence and is consistent with the presence of 
unobserved heterogeneous intercepts; and ii) the two-step GMM in level and differences (denoted 
by GMM2—Level Diff.) proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). 
This last estimation technique is appropriate for capturing mean stationarity. Note, however, that 
both estimation methods are two-step GMM. The two-step estimator is useful in this context 
because it both solves endogeneity issues as well as observed heterogeneity.  
As stated above, the five FMD indicators are grouped into two categories: stock market 
development (SMD) indicators (STKMKTCAP and STKVALTRA) and banking sector 
development (BSD) indicators (CREDIT, LLIAB and CCB). We perform a causality analysis for 
each variable within each category.  
3.3.1. Causality test between FDI and SMD 
i) Causality test between FDIGDP and STKMKTCAP 
From the unit root tests, we know that STKMKTCAP is a I(1) process. Given that the 
Granger causality test can only be performed on stationary variables, we have performed the 
causality test between FDIGDP and the first difference of STKMKTCAP. For the rest of this 
paper, we will precede the name of the variable by “D.” to denote the first difference. We wish to 
determine whether there is a Granger causal link between FDIGDP and D.STKMKTCAP.  
Table 4A presents the results of causality tests between FDIGDP and D.STKMKTCAP. It 
shows that D.STKMKTCAP Granger-causes FDIGDP at least at the 6.65% confidence level, 
independently of the type of instrument used. In the same table, we observe that FDIGDP causes 
D.STKMKTCAP at the 5.14% confidence level if the method of estimation is GMM2—Diff. 
where the instruments are only first differences. This is not the case if we use additional 
instruments such as variables in levels (GMM2—Level Diff.). From Arellano (2003), we know 
that the relevance of the type of instrument depends on the assumption of the variables’ mean 
stationarity. If the mean stationarity assumption holds, the accurate method is to use only first 
differences as instruments. A Sargan test does not reject the null hypothesis of mean stationarity 
for both variables. Therefore, GMM2—Diff. with first differences as instruments seems 
appropriate. We then conclude that at the 10% confidence level, we have bidirectional Granger-
causality between FDIGDP and D.STKMKTCAP.  
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Intuitively, the results of these causality tests suggest that if a country experiences a large 
increase in its stock market capitalisation, it will tend to attract more FDI in following years. 
Similarly, everything else being equal, countries that have attracted large amounts of FDI in 
recent years will tend to increase the speed of their stock market capitalisation.  
[Insert Table 4A Here] 
ii) Causality test between FDIGDP and STKVALTRA  
Because we know that FDIGDP and STKVALTRA are stationary processes, we can 
perform the Granger causality test on the two variables directly. In other words, we want to know 
whether there is a causal link between FDIGDP and STKVALTRA. Table 4B presents the results 
of causality tests between FDIGDP and STKVALTRA. From the GMM2—Diff. method with 
first differences as instruments, it appears that STKVALTRA Granger-causes FDI at the 10% 
confidence level, but that FDIGDP does not Granger-cause STKVALTRA.  
[Insert Table 4B Here] 
In sum, stock market development variables interact differently with FDIGDP. While 
there is a bidirectional causal relationship between STKMKTCAP and FDIGDP, the causality 
test between FDIGDP and STKVALTRA is inconclusive. Later, we analyse these relationships 
between FDI and SMD indicators by way of multivariate regressions.  
3.3.2.  Causality test between FDI and BSD 
i) Causality test between FDIGDP and CREDIT 
Given the uncertainty surrounding the stationary status of CREDIT, we will analyse both 
cases: the case where CREDIT is I(0) and the case where it is I(1). Table 4C presents the 
causality test results. In the first case, where we assume CREDIT to be a I(0) process, we find a 
unidirectional relationship. More precisely, CREDIT Granger-causes FDIGDP if the instruments 
used are level and first differences of the dependent variables. According to the Sargan over-
identification test, the GMM2—Level Diff. method with level and first differences as instruments 
is the right specification. 
In the second case, where we assume CREDIT to be a I(1) process, we need as before to 
differentiate CREDIT: the new differentiated variable is D.CREDIT. In this case, we find strong 
bidirectional causality between D.CREDIT and FDIGDP whatever the specification, meaning 
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that the growth rate of CREDIT has a bidirectional relationship with FDIGDP whatever the 
GMM estimation method used. 
[Insert Table 4C Here] 
ii) Causality test between FDIGDP and LLIAB 
Again according to the unit root tests, FDIGDP is I(0) and LLIAB is I(1). We therefore 
test the Granger causality between FDIGDP and the first difference of LLIAB, denoted by 
D.LLIAB. As shown in Table 4D, FDIGDP Granger-causes D.LLIAB if the estimation method 
used is GMM2—Level Diff., i.e., if we use level and first differences as instruments. The Sargan 
over-identification test confirms this estimation method to be correct. But D.LLIAB does not 
Granger-cause FDIGDP. 
[Insert Table 4D Here] 
iii) Causality test between FDIGDP and CCB 
From the unit root tests above, both FDIGDP and CCB are I(0) processes. The Granger 
causality test results between the two variables presented in Table 4E show that there is no causal 
relationship between FDIGDP and CCB, whatever the estimation method and whatever the 
direction. Thus, these two variables may be determined exogenously. 
[Insert Table 4E Here] 
In sum, the causality tests between BSD indicators and FDI are inconclusive. Below, we 
perform further multivariate analyses of the causal relationship between FDI and BSD indicators 
by way of endogenous simultaneous regressions. 
IV.  EMPIRICAL REGRESSION MODEL AND RESULTS 
4.1. Regression model specification  
For most FMD variables, our analyses of the direct causality tests between FDI and FMD are 
inconclusive. To achieve our objective of studying the relationship between FDI and FMD, 
therefore, and given the likelihood of endogeneity problems between the two set of variables, we 
turn to the following system of simultaneous equations: 
FDIit  = a0 + a1 FMDit + a2 EDUCATIONit + a3 INFLATIONit + a4 EXHRATEit +  
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a5 GOVERNANCEit + a6 LOG(GDPit-1) + a7 OPENNESSit + a8 NATRESit + a9 INFRASit + εit, 
            (3) 
FMDit = b0 + b1 FDIit + b2 EDUCATIONit + b3 INFLATIONit + b4 EXHRATEit +  
b5 GOVERNANCEit + b6 Log(GDPit-1)+b7 BALANCEit + b8 INTRATEit + νit.  (4) 
This system of endogenous simultaneous equations has been set to achieve identification that 
is at least theoretically sound. We chose the explanatory control variables on the basis of 
literature on the determinants of FDI and FMD. The control variables we used to estimate the 
determinants are as follows:  
Economic and policy variables 
- EDUCATION is the gross enrolment ratio (GER) for all levels of education. The level of 
a population’s education indicates the quality of the country’s human capital. 
- INFRAS is an infrastructure measure equal to Log(Phones per 1000 habitants). The level 
of infrastructure development has been found to be a key determinant of the inflow of FDI 
into a country.  
- NATRES is the natural resources variable and is measured by the share of fuel and 
minerals in exports. This variable has been recognized as a main determinant of FDI for 
countries endowed with substantial reserves of natural resources. 
- EXHRATE is the exchange rate variable. The exchange rate indicates the value of the 
local currency and is used as a proxy for macroeconomic stability and the country’s 
attractiveness to foreign investment. 
- INFLATION is the inflation rate measured by the percentage change in the GDP deflator. 
It is a good proxy for macroeconomic stability. Because inflation has a negative effect on 
borrowing rates and the cost of capital, we expect it to have a negative impact on BSD 
indicators. Inflation’s effect on SMD indicators can be positive, because under a high 
inflationary regime, it may be relatively less costly for companies to raise money through 
the stock market than through loans from banks and deposit institutions. 
- INTRATE is the real interest rate and is measured by the lending interest rate adjusted for 
inflation as measured by the GDP deflator. This rate can be seen as a proxy for the 
intensity of banks’ lending. A high real interest rate can hamper banks’ lending activities, 
creating an imbalance between credit and deposit activities and increasing banks’ 
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liquidity. 
- BALANCE is the current account balance over total GDP. It can be seen as a rough 
indicator of the health of the macroeconomic environment. 
- OPENNESS proxies for the degree of openness. It is equal to imports plus exports over 
GDP. In the literature on FDI determinants, this variable measures how friendly a country 
is to FDI. As such, it has been identified as a key determinant of a country’s attractiveness 
to FDI. We expect this variable to impact FDI positively and significantly. 
- LOG(GDPt-1) is the logarithm of lagged real GDP. It is used as a proxy for the size of the 
economy.  
Governance and institutional quality variables  
- GOVERNANCE measures the level of governance in a country and quality of the 
country’s institutions. It is measured by the KKM Index, a broad governance measure 
developed by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2009). The KKM Index is the average of 
six indicators that measure (i) voice and accountability; (ii) political stability and the 
absence of violence; (iii) regulatory quality; (iv) government effectiveness; (v) the rule of 
law; and (vi) the control of corruption.4  
Table 1 lists complete definitions of these control variables and states the source of data for 
each. 
From the theoretical arguments exposed in Section II, FMD may affect FDI positively 
because a well-functioning financial market can help attract foreign investors to the country. 
Conversely, FDI inflows may increase the flow of capital in the country, thereby increasing the 
resources available for financial intermediation and strengthening the financial sector. However, 
financial development is multidimensional and covers the development of the banking sector as 
well as that of the stock market. As we have shown in our direct causality tests, the type of FMD 
variable used is crucial to determining the direction of causality between FDI and FMD. We 
explore these causal relationships further by means of a system of endogenous simultaneous 
equations by controlling for other factors pertaining to the inflows of FDI to a country and the 
development of a country’s financial market.  
                                                 
4 The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project can be found at 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp. 
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Each equation in our system has at least one variable that is not available to the other equation 
of the system. Like any system of endogenous equations, we can use single equation methods, 
such as the two-stage least squares (2SLS) method, or full information methods, such as the 
three-stage least squares (3SLS) method, which requires joint estimation of the model equations. 
The theory of many of these estimation techniques has not yet been fully investigated in the 
context of panel data. For example, the 3SLS has not yet been implemented by mainstream 
econometric software. Our analysis uses the 2SLS method as the main estimation method for the 
panel data. For robustness, we use the 3SLS method with pool data.  
4.2. Relationship between FDI and FMD  
Tables 5A and 5B present the regression results of the 2SLS panel regressions of 
equations (3) and (4) for stock market development (SMD) and banking sector development 
(BSD) indicators, respectively. In Table 5A, we see that the FDIGDP and SMD indicators 
(STKMKTCAP and STKVALTRA) impact each other positively and significantly. This result 
confirms the bidirectional causality found between FDIGDP and STKMKTCAP.  
 [Insert Table 5A Here] 
Table 5B presents the results for the FDI and BSD variables. In all the regressions, we see 
that the BSD variables do not affect FDIGDP. We also note that FDIGDP only negatively and 
significantly affects CREDIT at the 5% confidence level, but it does not significantly affect the 
other BSD variables. In other words, over the 1994-2006 period, BSD variables had no 
significant effect on FDI, nor did FDI significantly affect BSD indicators. For CREDIT, the 
impact of FDI on BSD is even negative. These results confirm the results of our direct causality 
tests (discussed above): namely, that there is no positive causality relationship between FDI and 
BSD indicators. The negative significant impact of FDI on CREDIT is less obvious, and may be 
explained by the fact that an increase in FDI translates into an increase in the country’s GDP: 
since the CREDIT variable has GDP as its denominator, a marginal increase in the amount of 
credit to the private sector (the numerator) that is smaller than the marginal increase in GDP 
following an increase in FDI means that more FDI will cause the ratio of credit to the private 
sector over GDP (i.e., CREDIT) to fall.  
[Insert Table 5B Here] 
In both Tables 5A and 5B, the other determinants of the FDI and FMD indicators have the 
expected signs. For example, the size of the economy measured by LOG(GDPt-1) has a positive 
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impact on FMD indicators. As documented in previous work (e.g., Asiedu (2002), Dutta and Roy 
(2011), and Faeth (2009)), OPENNESS has a positive significant impact on FDI. This implies 
that more open or liberalised countries are likely to attract higher levels of FDI. The impact of 
BALANCE, a control variable, on FMD is ambiguous: BALANCE has a significantly negative 
impact on SMD and an ambiguous impact on BSD. Allen et al (2010) have found similar mixed 
results. The control variables EDUCATION, EXHRATE and GOVERNANCE positively affect 
FMD indicators whenever their coefficients are significant, while INFLATION has a mixed 
effect with a positive sign with SMD indicators and a negative sign with BSD indicators. In 
countries with higher inflation, people tend to have less trust in the banking system; at the same 
time, high inflation boosts stock market capitalisation.  
4.3. Relationship between FDI and the growth rate of FMD  
In this section, we control for the fact that some FMD variables are I(1) processes. We use 
the 2SLS estimation method with Error Correction Model panel regressions to see if earlier 
results still hold. As an additional check of robustness, we keep this specification for stationary 
FMD indicators, to see if the growth rate of a given variable affects FDI.  
Table 6A gives regression results for SMD indicators with this new specification. The 
results are almost the same as in the first specification but the amplitude of the effect of some 
variables differs. The main differences are that EDUCATION, which had not been significant, 
now has a positive significant sign as a determinant of D.STKMKTCAP, while INFLATION 
remains positive but is no longer significant. The other control variables conserve their expected 
signs. 
[Insert Table 6A Here] 
Table 6B presents the regression results for FDI and BSD indicators. We find that the 
impact of FDI on D.CREDIT and on D.LLIAB is not significant: FDI only impacts D.CCB 
positively. This contrasts slightly with our previous findings, when FDI had a negative significant 
impact on CREDIT and a positive but non-significant impact on CCB. We also obtain that 
D.CREDIT and D.CCB are non-significant determinants of FDI, while D.LLIAB only negatively 
impacts FDI at the 10% confidence level. These findings for the BSD indicators confirm our 
findings with level data for the BSD variables, i.e., the absence of causality between FDI and 
BSD indicators.  
[Insert Table 6B Here] 
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In sum, the results presented in Tables 6A and 6B confirm our previous results, namely 
that FDIGDP and SMD variables impact each other positively and significantly. With the BSD 
indicators, however, the results remain ambiguous and inconclusive. 
4.4. Robustness check 
In this section, we use the 3SLS estimation method to estimate our system of 
simultaneous equations. Given that almost no software has implemented the 3SLS method for 
panel data, we have used the 3SLS method with pool data, having assumed that the data can be 
pooled. Because previous analyses have proven the relevance of FMD indicators’ growth rates, 
we focus on the first differences of FMD indicators. 
The results of the regression figure in Tables 7A and 7B for SMD and BSD indicators 
respectively. We can see in Table 7A that the growth rate of stock market capitalisation 
positively and significantly impacts the ratio of FDI over GDP. Similarly, FDIGDP positively 
impacts D.STKMKTCAP. The same bidirectional relationship holds between FDIGDP and 
D.STKVALTRA. We conclude that whatever the estimation method used, FDIGDP and the 
SMD indicators positively and significantly impact each other at the same time.  
 [Insert Table 7A Here] 
From table 7B, we observe that FDIGDP negatively impacts D.CREDIT and D.LLIAB. 
To some extent, this negative relationship between FDIGDP and the BSD indicators was found in 
previous analyses. Overall, as in previous results, the causality between FDI and the BSD 
indicators is ambiguous and inconclusive. 
[Insert Table 7B Here] 
V. CONCLUSION  
This paper is an empirical study of the relationship between foreign direct investment and 
financial market development. We considered 29 emerging market economies over the 1994-
2006 period, using two indicators of stock market development and three indicators of banking 
sector development. 
Given the endogenous nature of the linkage between FDI and FMD, we not only use a 
VAR system to assess the Granger-causality between FDI and FMD, but we also run a system of 
simultaneous equations using panel data.  
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We find that FDI and stock market development indicators positively impact each other at 
the same time. When we use banking sector development indicators to measure financial market 
development, however, causality is ambiguous and inconclusive. We must therefore exercise 
great caution when analysing the relationship between FMD and FDI, as findings may depend on 
whether the FMD variables used to determine causality indicate stock market development or 
banking sector development. 
There are several ways to explain the bidirectional link between FDI and stock market 
development in these emerging economies. On one hand, foreign investment helps develop local 
stock markets by its investment spillover effects. This is because more foreign investment 
increases the likelihood that the affiliates of multinationals involved in FDI activities will be 
listed on local stock markets, since multinationals tend to hail from industrialised countries where 
financing through the stock market is a tradition. Furthermore, consistent with the political 
economy argument, one can conjecture that FDI inflows encourage the country’s political elite to 
adopt market-friendly regulations—especially investor protection and better governance 
regulations: this promotes the development of the stock market. On the other hand, a relatively 
well-developed stock market helps attract foreign investors, as such a market is perceived as a 
sign of vitality, of openness on the part of country authorities, and of a market-friendly 
environment. This is especially true in emerging markets, whose stock markets are more 
developed than are the markets of other developing countries.  
These findings suggest a key policy recommendation: that policies to attract more FDI be 
accompanied by market-friendly regulations, especially stock market regulations such as 
mechanisms to improve governance and protect investors. This will allow countries to maximise 
the benefits of the spillover effects of FDI.  
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Figure 1: Scatter plots of foreign direct investment and financial market 
development 
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Notes: FDIGDP is the ratio of foreign direct investment (FDI) to gross domestic product (GDP). 
STKMKTCAP is the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP. STKVALTRA is the ratio of stock value 
traded as a percentage of GDP. CREDIT is the ratio of private credit by deposit money banks and other 
financial institutions to GDP. LLIAB is the liquid liabilities of the financial system (currency plus demand 
and interest-bearing liabilities of banks and non-bank financial intermediaries) divided by GDP. CCB is the 
ratio of commercial bank assets divided by commercial bank plus central bank assets. 
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Table 1: Descriptions of the variables and of the sources of data 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION SOURCE OF DATA 
   
 FDI variables  
FDIGDP 
FDIGCF 
FDI / GDP 
FDI / GCF 
The World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators and Global Development Finance 
databases  
   
 FMD variables  
STKMKTCAP 
STKVALTRA 
STKTUR 
CREDIT 
 
LLIAB 
 
 
 
CCB 
 
Stock market capitalisation / GDP 
Value traded as a percentage of GDP 
Stock market turnover 
Total credit by financial intermediaries to the 
private sector / GDP   
Liquid liabilities of the financial system (currency 
plus demand and interest-bearing liabilities of 
banks and non-bank financial intermediaries) / 
GDP 
Ratio of commercial bank assets / commercial 
bank plus central bank assets 
The World Bank’s Global Development 
Finance6 database and the International 
Monetary Fund’s International Financial 
Statistics database 
   
 Economic and policy variables  
INFLATION 
INFRAS 
OPENNESS 
LOG(GDPt-1) 
NATRES  
EXHRATE  
BALANCE 
INTRATE 
 
EDUCATION 
 
Percentage change in GDP deflator 
Log(Phones per 1000 population) 
(Import + Export) / GDP 
Logarithm of lagged real GDP 
Share of fuel and minerals in exports 
Exchange rate 
Current account balance / GDP 
Lending interest rate adjusted for inflation as 
measured by the GDP deflator   
Gross enrolment ratio for all levels of education 
The World Development Indicators database of 
the World Bank; the UNESCO database 
(EDUCATION only) 
   
 Governance and institutional quality variables  
GOVERNANCE 
 
 
 
The KKM index is the average of six Worldwide 
Governance Indicators:  
1. Voice and accountability 
2. Political stability and absence of violence 
3. Regulatory quality 
4. Government effectiveness 
5. Rule of law 
6. Control of corruption 
The Worldwide Governance Indicators project 
(see 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/inde
x.asp) 
 
 
   
 
Notes: FDI=foreign direct investment; GDP=gross domestic product; GCF=gross fixed capital formation. 
                                                 
6 The link to the Global Development Finance data is 
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:20696167~
pagePK:64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html  
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Table 2: Correlation between foreign direct investment and financial market 
development variables 
 CREDIT LLIAB CCB STKMKTCAP STKVALTRA FDIGDP FDIGCF
CREDIT 1       
LLIAB 0.6683 1      
CCB 0.4413 0.2395 1     
STKMKTCAP  0.6570 0.5173 0.2455 1    
STKVALTRA 0.5887 0.4171 0.2752 0.6341 1   
FDIGDP 0.2003 0.3253 0.1501 0.3830 0.2501 1  
FDIGCF 0.1686 0.2697 0.1379 0.3559 0.1855 0.9601 1
Notes: FDIGDP is the ratio of foreign direct investment (FDI) to gross domestic product (GDP). FDIGCF 
is the ratio of FDI to gross fixed capital formation. STKMKTCAP is the ratio of stock market capitalization 
to GDP. STKVALTRA is the ratio of stock value traded as a percentage of GDP. CREDIT is the ratio of 
private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions to GDP. LLIAB is the liquid 
liabilities of the financial system (currency plus demand and interest-bearing liabilities of banks and non-
bank financial intermediaries) divided by GDP. CCB is the ratio of commercial bank assets divided by 
commercial bank plus central bank assets. 
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Table 3: Panel unit root tests 
 FDIGDP STKMKTCAP STKVALTRA CREDIT CCB LLIAB 
Method Stat. Prob. Dec. Stat Prob. Dec Stat. Prob. Dec Stat Prob Dec Stat Prob Dec Stat. Prob. Dec 
Level                         
Levin, Lin and Chu  t (1) -3.91 0 AUR 6.31 1.00 PUR -17 0 AUR -11.13 0 AUR -6.47 0 AUR 4.42 1 PUR 
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat (2) -2.99 0 AUR 2.77 0.99 PUR -3.81 0 AUR -1.42 0.08 AUR -4.22 0 AUR 0.94 0.83 PUR 
ADF – Fisher Chi-square (2) 111.6 0 AUR 47 0.80 PUR 111.5 0 AUR 91.81 0.00 AUR 111.6 0 AUR 66.42 0.12 PUR 
PP – Fisher Chi-square (2) 119.7 0 AUR 29.86 0.99 PUR 61.75 0.34 AUR 43.32 0.89 PUR 87.9 0 AUR 36.67 0.98 PUR 
First Difference                         
Levin, Lin and Chu  t (1) -7.35 0 AUR -30.3 0 AUR -18.4 0 AUR 7.93 1 PUR -9.53 0 AUR -33.82 0 AUR 
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat (2) -7.85 0 AUR -6.94 0 AUR -9.85 0 AUR 0.47 0.68 PUR -8.55 0 AUR -11.51 0 AUR 
ADF – Fisher Chi-square (2) 171.6 0 AUR 131.2 0 AUR 125.3 0 AUR 96.93 0 AUR 163.8 0 AUR 176.4 0 AUR 
PP – Fisher Chi-square (2) 331.5 0 AUR 86.42 0.01 AUR 212.7 0 AUR 109.9 0 AUR 201.8 0 AUR 130.2 0 AUR 
Notes: FDIGDP is the ratio of FDI to GDP. STKMKTCAP is the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP. STKVALTRA is the ratio of stock value traded as a percentage of 
GDP. CREDIT is the ratio of private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions to GDP. LLIAB is the liquid liabilities of the financial system (currency plus 
demand and interest-bearing liabilities of banks and non-bank financial intermediaries) divided by GDP. CCB is the ratio of commercial bank assets divided by commercial bank 
plus central bank assets. (1) The Levin, Lin and Chu test assumes a common unit root process. (2) The other tests (Im, Pesaran and Shin; ADF; and PP) assume an individual unit 
root process. ADF is the augmented Dikey-Fuller unit root test and PP is the Phillips-Perron unit root test. AUR indicates the absence of a unit root and PUR indicates the presence 
of a unit root. 
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Table 4A: Causality tests between FDIGDP and STKMKTCAP 
 FDIGDP FDIGDP D.STKMKTCAP D.STKMKTCAP
  GMM2--Diff
GMM2--Level. 
Diff GMM2--Diff 
GMM2--Level. 
Diff
FDIGDP(t-1) 0.0833919 0.5176485*** -0.0182675** -0.0052687
 (0.2304652) (0.0640622) (0.008522) (0.0103214)
FDIGDP(t-2) -0.1653217 0.2037235*** -0.0195661** -0.0061985
 (0.2781927) (0.0746479) (0.0088878) (0.0062273)
D.STKMKTCAP(t-1) 5.230495* 5.917832** 0.1472544 0.1950357
 (4.092635) (2.760846) (0.134511) (0.2146659)
D.STKMKTCAP(t-2) -0.2477217 -5.524277*** -0.3398284*** -0.5150559
 (2.122503) (1.056543) (0.1013939) (0.2074006)
Chi-square test 5.42* 53.57*** 5.94* 1.9
Df 2 2 2 2
p-value 0.0665 0 0.0514 0.3865
Observations 248 276 248 276
Number of ncode 28 28 28 28
Notes: FDIGDP is the ratio of foreign direct investment (FDI) to gross domestic product (GDP). 
STKMKTCAP is the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
***=p<0.01; **=p<0.05; *=p<0.1. 
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Table 4B: Causality tests between FDIGDP and STKVALTRA 
  FDIGDP FDIGDP STKVALTRA STKVALTRA
VARIABLES GMM2-Diff
GMM2-Level. 
Diff GMM2-Diff
GMM2-Level. 
Diff
FDIGDP(t-1) 0.0894 0.425*** -1.961 -2.367
 (0.275) (0.0857) (2.868) (1.855)
FDIGDP(t-2) -0.223 0.0379 -0.238 1.165
 (0.322) (0.106) (2.276) (2.107)
STKVALTRA(t-1) 0.0357 0.0382* 0.637 1.068***
 (0.0252) (0.0212) (0.529) (0.190)
STKVALTRA(t-2) -0.0182 -0.00278 -0.0895 -0.0668
 (0.0213) (0.0168) (0.437) (0.101)
Chi-square test 2.01 4.04 1.21 3.87
Df 2 2 2 2
P-value 0.3659 0.1327 0.5471 0.1448
Observations 277 306 272 301
Number of ncode 29 29 29 29
Notes: FDIGDP is the ratio of foreign direct investment (FDI) to gross domestic product (GDP). 
STKVALTRA is the ratio of stock value traded as a percentage of GDP. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
***=p<0.01; **=p<0.05; *=p<0.1. 
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Table 4C: Causality tests between FDIGDP and CREDIT 
FDIGDP and CREDIT are (I(0)) 
 FPIGDP FDIGDP CREDIT CREDIT
VARIABLES GMM2-Diff
GMM2-Level. 
Diff GMM2-Diff 
GMM2-Level. 
Diff
FDIGDP(t-1) 0.196 0.305** 0.000364 0.000866
 (0.168) (0.123) (0.0499) (0.0346)
FDIGDP(t-2) -0.261 -0.160 0.000786 0.00124
 (0.222) (0.194) (0.0242) (0.0139)
CREDIT(t-1) 2.053** 6.057** 1.077 1.409
 (0.831) (3.076) (8.061) (0.963)
CREDIT(t-2) 1.118 1.504 -0.394 -0.436
  (5.333) (14.91) (3.296) (0.722)
Chi-square test 1.991 32.51 0.0159 0.0256
Df 2 2 2 2
P-value 0.3695 0 0.9921 0.9873
Observations 274 302 274 302
Number of ncode 28 28 28 28
 
FDIGDP (I(0)) and CREDIT (I(1)) 
 FDIGDP FDIGDP D.CREDIT D.CREDIT
  GMM2--Diff
GMM2--Level. 
Diff GMM2—Diff 
GMM2--Level. 
Diff
FDIGDP(t-1) 0.2225253*** 0.5973818*** 0.0000571 -0.0022485***
 (0.0065899) (0.0103269) (0.0000851) (0.0002976)
FDIGDP(t-2) -0.2424165*** 0.0776598*** 0.0006425*** -0.0000733
 (0.0068558) (0.0026983) (0.0001657) (0.0001869)
D.CREDIT(t-1) -2.562363*** -2.467033* 0.4371431*** 0.4356329***
 (0.960259) (1.313218) (0.0154857) (0.0101164)
D.CREDIT(t-2) 8.770588*** 17.53928*** -0.1750518*** -0.1862194***
 (0.1994549) (0.7200644) (0.0068078) (0.0041465)
Chi-square test 1995.14 27769.82 27.05 208.8
Df 2 2 2 2
p-value 0 0 0 0
Obs. 247 275 247 275
Number of ncode 28 28 28 28
Notes: FDIGDP is the ratio of foreign direct investment (FDI) to gross domestic product (GDP).  CREDIT 
is the ratio of private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions to GDP. Standard errors 
are in parentheses. ***=p<0.01; **=p<0.05; *=p<0.1. 
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Table 4D: Causality tests between FDIGDP and LLIAB 
 FDIGDP FDIGDP D.LLIAB D.LLIAB
VARIABLES GMM2-Diff
GMM2-Level. 
Diff GMM2-Diff
GMM2-Level. 
Diff
FDIGDP(t-1) 0.212 0.557*** 0.0121 0.0278
 (0.249) (0.140) (0.0995) (0.100)
FDIGDP(t-2) -0.272 0.0155 0.193 0.219**
 (0.208) (0.0929) (0.207) (0.105)
D.LLIAB(t-1) 0.0828 0.111 0.237** 0.225**
 (0.0510) (0.0867) (0.117) (0.0878)
D.LLIAB(t-2) 0.0490 0.0668 0.0161 -0.00541
  (0.0834) (0.0819) (0.0871) (0.0713)
Chi-square test 2.810 3.450 0.921 13.70
Df 2 2 2 2
p-value 0.2453 0.1782 0.6308 0.0011
Observations 247 275 247 275
Number of ncode 28 28 28 28
Notes: FDIGDP is the ratio of foreign direct investment (FDI) to gross domestic product (GDP). LLIAB is 
the liquid liabilities of the financial system (currency plus demand and interest-bearing liabilities of banks 
and non-bank financial intermediaries) divided by GDP. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***=p<0.01; 
**=p<0.05; *=p<0.1. 
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Table 4E: Causality tests between FDIGDP and CCB 
  FDIGDP FDIGDP CCB CCB
VARIABLES GMM2-Diff
GMM2-Level. 
Diff GMM2-Diff 
GMM2-Level. 
Diff
FDIGDP(t-1) 0.312 0.367 0.0253 -0.00503
 (0.557) (0.483) (1.002) (1.365)
FDIGDP(t-2) -0.00200 0.0517 -0.0769 0.0209
 (0.164) (0.158) (1.480) (2.480)
CCB(t-1) 0.0288 0.0286 0.801 1.085
 (0.0383) (0.0647) (6.771) (1.045)
CCB(t-2) 0.0343 0.0177 -0.0363 -0.0667
 (0.258) (0.109) (1.748) (1.002)
Chi-square test 0.63 4.58 0.01 0
Df 2 2 2 2
p-value 0.7292 0.101 0.9927 0.9999
Observations 254 281 253 280
Number of ncode 27 27 26 27
Notes: FDIGDP is the ratio of foreign direct investment (FDI) to gross domestic product (GDP). CCB is 
the ratio of commercial bank assets divided by commercial bank plus central bank assets. Standard errors 
are in parentheses. ***=p<0.01; **=p<0.05; *=p<0.1. 
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Table 5A: Two-stage least squares panel regression results for stock market 
development indicators 
  (1) (2) (1) (2)
VARIABLES FDIGDP STKMKTCAP FDIGDP STKVALTRA
   
STKMKTCAP 0.0448***  
 (0.0154)  
STKVALTRA 0.0463*** 
 (0.0164) 
EDUCATION -0.000773 0.00407 -0.000659 0.00300
 (0.000740) (0.00781) (0.000801) (0.00810)
INFLATION -0.000309 0.00957** 6.68e-06 0.00252
 (0.000410) (0.00444) (0.000415) (0.00464)
EXHRATE 2.25e-06 -4.01e-05 -4.31e-07 4.97e-06
 (1.10e-05) (0.000121) (1.13e-05) (0.000123)
NATRES 0.0288 0.0630 
 (0.0721) (0.0775) 
GOVERNANCE 0.0146 -0.227 0.00320 0.0313
 (0.0154) (0.173) (0.0170) (0.178)
LOG(GDPt-1) -0.0116 0.404* -0.00142 0.231
 (0.0250) (0.240) (0.0258) (0.249)
OPENNESS 0.000597*** 0.000609*** 
 (0.000212) (0.000218) 
INFRAS 1.28e-05 -1.82e-05 
 (0.000128) (0.000147) 
FDIGDP 8.350***  7.578***
 (2.090)  (2.150)
BALANCE -0.0209***  -0.0223***
 (0.00657)  (0.00676)
INTRATE -0.00465  -0.00342
 (0.00283)  (0.00293)
  
Observations 167 167 165 165
R-square 0.279 0.254 0.227 0.164
Number of ncode 25 25 25 25
Notes: FDIGDP is the ratio of foreign direct investment (FDI) to gross domestic product (GDP). 
STKMKTCAP is the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP. STKVALTRA is the ratio of stock value 
traded as a percentage of GDP. The other variables are described in Table 1. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. ***=p<0.01; **=p<0.05; *=p<0.1. 
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Table 5B: Two-stage least squares panel regression results for banking sector 
development indicators 
  (1) (2)  (1) (2)  (1) (2)
VARIABLES FDIGDP CREDIT FDIGDP LLIAB FDIGDP CCB
            
CREDIT -0.443  
 (0.478)  
LLIAB  1.975  
  (5.260)  
CCB  0.845 
  (0.697) 
EDUCATION -0.00121 -0.00325 -0.0117 0.00482** -0.00327 0.00277*
 (0.00172) (0.00467) (0.0274) (0.00189) (0.00209) (0.00151)
INFLATION 0.000875 0.00267 -0.00137 0.00112 0.00408 -0.00466***
 (0.00130) (0.00265) (0.00434) (0.00107) (0.00341) (0.000895)
EXHRATE 2.48e-05 3.59e-05 -8.47e-05 4.63e-05** -1.04e-05 -3.82e-06
 (4.63e-05) (4.98e-05) (0.000191) (2.01e-05) (1.57e-05) (1.59e-05)
NATRES -0.118 0.0569 0.00551 
 (0.268) (0.358) (0.158) 
GOVERNANCE 0.0759 0.166 0.0159 0.00106 -0.0998 0.125***
 (0.0742) (0.104) (0.0808) (0.0419) (0.102) (0.0343)
LOG(GDPt-1) 0.156 0.333** -0.543 0.192*** -0.133 0.153***
 (0.175) (0.159) (1.472) (0.0641) (0.110) (0.0431)
OPENNESS -0.000391 7.38e-05 0.000928** 
 (0.00139) (0.00222) (0.000412) 
INFRAS -0.000136 0.00152 6.51e-05 
 (0.000434) (0.00374) (0.000270) 
FDIGDP  -3.725*** 0.0296  0.0478
  (1.364) (0.551)  (0.417)
BALANCE  -0.00370 -0.000123  -0.00131
  (0.00392) (0.00158)  (0.00127)
INTRATE  -0.000611 8.19e-05  -0.000514
  (0.00169) (0.000682)  (0.000561)
   
Observations 165 165 165 165 165 165
R-square -3.415 -0.662 -18.824 0.345 -2.147 0.501
Number of 
ncode 24 24  24 24  24 24
Notes: FDIGDP is the ratio of foreign direct investment (FDI) to gross domestic product (GDP). CREDIT 
is the ratio of private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions to GDP. LLIAB is the 
liquid liabilities of the financial system (currency plus demand and interest-bearing liabilities of banks and 
non-bank financial intermediaries) divided by GDP. CCB is the ratio of commercial bank assets divided by 
commercial bank plus central bank assets. The other variables are described in Table 1. Standard errors are 
in parentheses. ***=p<0.01; **=p<0.05; *=p<0.1. 
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Table 6A: Two-stage least squares Error Correction Model panel regression 
results for stock market development indicators 
  (1) (2)  (1) (2)
VARIABLES FDIGDP D.STKMKTCAP FDIGDP D.STKVALTRA
        
D.STKMKTCAP 0.143**  
 (0.0699)  
D.STKVALTRA 0.120* 
 (0.0616) 
EDUCATION -0.00136 0.00954* -0.000636 0.00470
 (0.000975) (0.00503) (0.00115) (0.00568)
INFLATION -0.000592 0.00543 0.000349 0.000518
 (0.000660) (0.00340) (0.000638) (0.00391)
EXHRATE 5.64e-07 -8.62e-06 2.45e-06 8.52e-06
 (1.60e-05) (9.60e-05) (1.70e-05) (0.000107)
NATRES -0.000598 -0.0214 
 (0.110) (0.129) 
GOVERNANCE 0.0106 -0.130 0.00749 0.00626
 (0.0230) (0.136) (0.0246) (0.152)
LOG(GDPt-1) -0.0924 0.477 -0.0237 0.320
 (0.101) (0.544) (0.0986) (0.619)
OPENNESS 0.00101*** 0.000827*** 
 (0.000288) (0.000300) 
INFRAS -0.000137 4.38e-05 
 (0.000203) (0.000175) 
FDIGDP 5.555***  5.589***
 (1.940)  (1.981)
STKMKTCAPt-1 -0.453***  
 (0.106)  
STKVALTRAt-1  -0.582***
  (0.107)
BALANCE -0.0125**  -0.0162***
 (0.00498)  (0.00556)
INTRATE -0.00215  -0.00209
 (0.00229)  (0.00255)
  
Observations 165 165 164 164
R-square -0.534 -0.022 -0.677 0.029
Number of ncode 24 24  25 25
Notes: FDIGDP is the ratio of foreign direct investment (FDI) to gross domestic product (GDP). 
STKMKTCAP is the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP. STKVALTRA is the ratio of stock value 
traded as a percentage of GDP. The other variables are described in Table 1. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. ***=p<0.01; **=p<0.05; *=p<0.1. 
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Table 6B: Two-stage least squares Error Correction Model panel regression 
results for banking sector development indicators 
  (1) (2)  (1) (2)  (1) (2)
VARIABLES FDIGDP D.CREDIT FDIGDP D.LLIAB FDIGDP D.CCB
            
D.CREDIT 1.110  
 (1.076)  
D.LLIAB  -0.503*  
  (0.295)  
D.CCB  -0.382 
  (0.368) 
EDUCATION 0.00249 -0.00168 -0.00124 0.000437 -0.00180** 0.000493
 (0.00420) (0.00157) (0.000922) (0.000917) (0.000785) (0.000649)
INFLATION 0.000294 -0.000510 -0.000159 -0.000488 0.000158 -0.000971**
 (0.00113) (0.00103) (0.000556) (0.000544) (0.000449) (0.000459)
EXHRATE -4.81e-05 1.68e-05 -7.47e-06 1.66e-05* -1.38e-05* 4.39e-06
 (3.88e-05) (1.89e-05) (1.07e-05) (1.00e-05) (7.90e-06) (7.25e-06)
NATRES 0.264 0.0524 0.134 
 (0.259) (0.0923) (0.0837) 
GOVERNANCE -0.0189 0.0260 0.0228 0.0285 0.0328 0.0574***
 (0.0554) (0.0425) (0.0214) (0.0219) (0.0226) (0.0164)
LOG(GDPt-1) -0.390 0.343** 0.109 0.138 0.0345 0.0739
 (0.421) (0.169) (0.103) (0.0895) (0.0752) (0.0655)
OPENNESS 0.00210 0.000551* 0.000866*** 
 (0.00135) (0.000304) (0.000219) 
INFRAS -0.000494 7.83e-05 0.000175 
 (0.000693) (0.000146) (0.000109) 
FDIGDP  -0.681 -0.301  0.309*
  (0.443) (0.240)  (0.184)
CREDITt-1  -0.0263  
  (0.0518)  
LLIABt-1  -0.173***  
  (0.0399)  
CCBt-1   -0.210***
   (0.0342)
BALANCE  -0.00262* 0.00120  0.000438
  (0.00153) (0.000808)  (0.000588)
INTRATE  -0.000226 0.000541  -0.000667**
  (0.000690) (0.000369)  (0.000275)
   
Observations 165 165 165 165 165 165
R-square -4.650 0.025 -0.341 0.160 0.159 0.205
Number of ncode 24 24  24 24  24 24
Notes: FDIGDP is the ratio of foreign direct investment (FDI) to gross domestic product (GDP). CREDIT 
is the ratio of private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions to GDP. LLIAB is the 
liquid liabilities of the financial system (currency plus demand and interest-bearing liabilities of banks and 
non-bank financial intermediaries) divided by GDP. CCB is the ratio of commercial bank assets divided by 
commercial bank plus central bank assets. The other variables are described in Table 1. Standard errors are 
in parentheses. ***=p<0.01; **=p<0.05; *=p<0.1. 
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Table 7A: Three-stage least squares regression results for stock market 
development indicators 
  (1) (2)  (1) (2)
VARIABLES FDIGDP D.STKMKTCAP FDIGDP D.STKVALTRA
        
D.STKMKTCAP 0.318**  
 (0.124)  
D.STKVALTRA 0.283** 
 (0.118) 
EDUCATION -0.000375 0.00141 0.000184 -0.000560
 (0.000447) (0.00137) (0.000491) (0.00157)
INFLATION -0.000216 0.00104 0.000396 -0.000873
 (0.000687) (0.00216) (0.000748) (0.00244)
EXHRATE 2.32e-08 -2.28e-06 4.82e-08 -3.45e-06
 (2.19e-06) (6.51e-06) (2.06e-06) (6.51e-06)
NATRES 0.00638 0.00990 
 (0.0156) (0.0191) 
GOVERNANCE 0.0129 -0.0417 0.00792 -0.0283
 (0.00972) (0.0325) (0.0106) (0.0372)
LOG(GDPt-1) -0.193 0.684 -0.124 0.533
 (0.157) (0.424) (0.158) (0.484)
OPENNESS 0.000170** 0.000204*** 
 (6.90e-05) (7.00e-05) 
INFRAS 4.17e-05 8.49e-05 
 (0.000190) (8.83e-05) 
FDIGDP 1.759**  1.577*
 (0.727)  (0.815)
BALANCE -0.00281  -0.00396*
 (0.00200)  (0.00240)
INTRATE 0.000266  0.000384
 (0.000469)  (0.000418)
CONSTANT 0.0422 -0.157 -0.00925 0.0144
 (0.0368) (0.115) (0.0409) (0.131)
  
Observations 166 166 164 164
R-square -1.502 0.073  -1.649 0.027
Notes: FDIGDP is the ratio of foreign direct investment (FDI) to gross domestic product (GDP). 
STKMKTCAP is the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP. STKVALTRA is the ratio of stock value 
traded as a percentage of GDP. The other variables are described in Table 1. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. ***=p<0.01; **=p<0.05; *=p<0.1. 
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Table 7B: Three-stage least squares regression results for banking sector 
development indicators 
  (1) (2)  (1) (2)  (1) (2)
VARIABLES FDIGDP D.CREDIT FDIGDP D.LLIAB FDIGDP D.CCB
            
D.CREDIT 1.333**  
 (0.626)  
D.LLIAB  -0.586  
  (0.487)  
D.CCB  0.198 
  (0.348) 
EDUCATION 0.000547 -0.000133 6.78e-05 -2.65e-06 0.000150 -5.77e-05
 (0.000721) (0.000423) (0.000334) (0.000268) (0.000287) (0.000191)
INFLATION -0.000197 0.000501 -0.000192 -0.000555 1.15e-06 0.00106***
 (0.000887) (0.000660) (0.000563) (0.000418) (0.000478) (0.000300)
EXHRATE -4.76e-06* 2.56e-06* 1.01e-06 2.12e-06** -2.73e-07 4.59e-07
 (2.85e-06) (1.42e-06) (1.33e-06) (9.06e-07) (8.12e-07) (6.35e-07)
NATRES 0.0251 0.00395 -0.0104 
 (0.0282) (0.0140) (0.0208) 
GOVERNANCE -0.0145 0.0114 0.0122 0.0149** 0.00299 0.00864*
 (0.0188) (0.0102) (0.00788) (0.00630) (0.00819) (0.00454)
LOG(GDPt-1) -0.537* 0.427*** 0.143 0.231*** 0.0236 0.114*
 (0.312) (0.134) (0.134) (0.0858) (0.0894) (0.0602)
OPENNESS 0.000637*** 0.000184*** 0.000257*** 
 (0.000243) (5.74e-05) (4.77e-05) 
INFRAS 0.000157 0.000105 0.000106 
 (0.000163) (0.000105) (9.49e-05) 
FDIGDP  -0.457** -0.552***  -0.0357
  (0.216) (0.120)  (0.101)
BALANCE  -0.00255*** 0.000835**  -0.000696**
  (0.000647) (0.000371)  (0.000300)
INTRATE  0.000243 0.000219  -0.000575***
  (0.000223) (0.000205)  (0.000166)
CONSTANT -0.0446 0.00472 0.00867 0.0171 -0.00290 0.00594
 (0.0597) (0.0353) (0.0272) (0.0223) (0.0224) (0.0160)
   
Observations 165 165 165 165 166 166
R-square -2.997 0.148  0.025 -0.255  0.375 0.174
Notes: FDIGDP is the ratio of foreign direct investment (FDI) to gross domestic product (GDP). CREDIT 
is the ratio of private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions to GDP. LLIAB is the 
liquid liabilities of the financial system (currency plus demand and interest-bearing liabilities of banks and 
non-bank financial intermediaries) divided by GDP. CCB is the ratio of commercial bank assets divided by 
commercial bank plus central bank assets. The other variables are described in Table 1. Standard errors are 
in parentheses. ***=p<0.01; **=p<0.05; *=p<0.1. 
